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HOMELESSNESS IN A MODERN
URBAN SETTING
I. Introduction
The number of homeless persons I in urban areas has increased at an
alarming rate-it is estimated 2 that there are 30,000 homeless men
and 6,000 homeless women in New York City alone. 3 The increasing
1. The definition of a homeless person varies according to the sociological and
legal material consulted. One New York City study defined the homeless as "those
whose primary nighttime residence is either in the publicly or privately operated
shelters or in the streets, in doorways, train stations and bus terminals, public plazas
and parks, subways, abandoned buildings, loading docks and other well hidden sites
known only to their users." E. BAXTER & K. HoPPER, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES:
HOMELESS ADULTS ON THE STREETS OF NEW YORK 6-7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES]. Another author defined the homeless as persons suffer-
ing from "a condition of detachment from society characterized by the absence or
attentuation of the affiliative bonds that link settled persons to a network of intercon-
nected social structures." H. BAHR, SKID Row, AN INTRODUCTION TO DISAFFILIATION
17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SKo Row]. A survey by this Note's author sent to 25
social service agencies around the country defined homeless persons as "those persons
who are unemployed for more than a temporary period of time with no visible means
of support and who live in the streets, abandoned buildings, doorways, transporta-
tion facilities, public parks or under bridges." See also Beck & Marden, Street
Dwellers, 86 NAT. HIST. 78 (1977).
2. Because of their transient, secretive and disaffiliated nature, it is difficult to
make accurate estimates of the number of homeless persons in New York City.
3. PRIVATE LIvES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 8-9. This figure was used in
testimony during public hearings by City Council President Carol Bellamy. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at B4, col. 1.
It also is estimated that Washington, D.C. has a homeless population of between
5,000-10,000, Boston between 4,000-8,000 and Philadelphia approximately 3,360.
PRIVATE LIvES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 9. During 1981 there were approxi-
mately 5,900 homeless women in Baltimore, and at least half of these women were
accompanied by children (2,500-3,000). B. WALSH & D. DAVENPORT, THE LONG
LONELINESS IN BALTIMORE: A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN 39-56 (Sept. 1981) [herein-
after cited as A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN]. Other estimates of homeless persons in
Baltimore are 12,000 homeless men and 8,580 homeless women. These figures are
from a survey sent by this Note's author to Social Services Agencies in eight states
covering approximately 25 counties throughout the U.S. Pinellas County, Florida,
which incorporates the City of St. Petersburg, estimates that there are approximately
200 homeless men and between 50-60 homeless women within its boundaries. Id.
Alameda County, California, which incorporates the City of Oakland, is capable of
providing 6,361 bed days per month, but estimates that 1,895 individuals per month
must be rejected because of a lack of available shelter. United Way of the Bay Area,
United Way Subcommittee on Emergency Shelters: Final Report 3-4 (1980). A study
comparing two groups of disaffiliated women found that homeless women tended to
be younger than homeless men, better educated, drank alone but less heavity, and
probably had more attenuated social ties than men. Black, homeless women of lower
socioeconomic levels comprised a larger portion of the homeless women population
than their relative representation in the overall population. Three-fourths of the
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gravity of the homelessness problem has gained recognition because
homeless individuals are no longer confined to skid row neighbor-
hoods 4 but are encountered throughout American cities. 5
homeless women had been married at least once and marital instability amongst
homeless women was prevalent. This study also found that a majority of homeless
women came from broken homes. The vast majority of homeless women were native
born, 89% had an income of $100 per month or less, 67% had some high school
education or had graduated from high school, 62 % were between the ages of 35-54,
79 % expressed Protestantism or Catholicism as their religious preference, 48 % had a
father with an eighth grade education or less and 54 % had a mother with an eighth
grade education or less. The authors concluded that female homelessness often re-
sulted from a woman's failure to fulfill the traditional roles of wife and mother. The
cause of homelessness in men, however, was found to be more commonly related to
failure in one's occupational role. H. BAHR & G. GARRET, WOMEN ALONE (1976). See
generally Beck & Marden, Street Dwellers, 86 NAT. HIST. 78, 81 (1977).
4. Although the historic causes of homelessness in the United States were similar to
those in Great Britain and other European nations, S. WALLACE, SKID RoW AS A WAY
OF LIFE 9 (1965), American cities witnessed the creation of "skid row" neighbor-
hoods-economically depressed urban communities. The most famous of these "skid
row" neighborhoods is the section of New York City known as the "Bowery," where a
mission and lodging facility for indigent men was first opened in the 1870's. SKID
Row, supra note 1, at 32. The term "skid row" is a derivative of "skid road" and
dates back to the mid-19th century. Lumberjacks in the Northwest used to slide or
skid cut logs down the middle of crude roads. Shanties and cheap hotels sprang up
along these roads to accommodate loggers and provide for their physical pleasures.
The term skid road was applied to these areas and eventually was shortened to "skid
row." S. WALLACE, SKID RoW AS A WAY OF LIFE 18 (1965). The stereotypical skid row
began shortly after the Civil War when many discharged soldiers and displaced
families and slaves flocked to the urban communities only to find that reintegration
into society was difficult. Id. at 13-15; MoRRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 770 (1965). Immigration aggravated the problem, causing large
numbers of homeless people without jobs to live in the streets. S. WALLACE, SKID ROW
AS A WAY OF LIFE 14-15 (1965). During the economic strife and depression of 1873-
1876, facilities were established specifically to alleviate the plight of the urban
unemployed. Once the economic climate improved, these facilities assumed the task
of providing for vagrants and the homeless. SKID Row, supra note 1, at 35. A study
was recently conducted of the five skid rows of Chicago, which encompass institu-
tions such as bars, flophouses, rescue missions, temporary employment offices, pawn-
shops and second hand stores. W. MCSHEEHY, SKID Row 13-15 (1979). The author
found that, historically, policies dealing with the homeless and vagrants attempted to
modify what was deemed apathetic, indolent behavior by incarceration in jails,
workhouses or labor colonies. Id. at 105. Today, the strategy has changed and other
devices are utilized because the homeless are viewed as mentally disabled. Responsi-
bility for their care has thus been shifted to the therapeutic community. Id. at 106.
Urban Renewal funds have been used to destroy the physical institutions of skid row
with the hope of dispersing those already there and of abolishing the sanctuary to
which future homeless persons would gravitate. Id. "Methods for dealing with
tramps and bums today are not more humane, only more subtle. Greed and preju-
dice are far more influential than reason in determining policies which affect men on
skid row." Id. at 107. See also Lee, The Disappearance of Skid Row: Some Ecological
Evidence, 16 URB. AFF. Q. 81 (1980). The author described the decline of the skid
row communities in urban areas between 1950-1970. The skid row communities
were tolerated by society because they served the important economic purpose of
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The enormity of the homelessness problem in New York City, and
the willingness of the state legislature to focus its attention on the
relevant legal issues, has placed New York in the forefront of those
jurisdictions which accord legal rights to homeless persons through
court decisions and legislation. A legal action commenced in New
York City on behalf of six homeless men' resulted in a consent decree
which guarantees homeless men the right to certain minimum living
and health standards. 7  The New York State Legislature also has
attempted to deal with the homelessness problem. In 1981 it enacted
providing an unskilled labor pool. Id. at 102. Due to historic preservation, gentrifica-
tion, conversions to luxury housing, federal funding for urban rehabilitation and
other measures undertaken to halt urban decay, much of the low cost housing and
institutions which formerly comprised skid row have been severely reduced. Id. at
103. While skid row as a centralized community is breaking down, the numbers of
homeless persons are increasing at a rapid rate. The author hypothesized that these
conditions will lead to a decentralized skid row community with the appearance of
widely dispersed "mini skid rows." These "mini skid rows" will offer less social
organization, institutional support and community cohesiveness than the centralized
skid row. In order to stop the break-up of the territorially definable concept of skid
row, the author suggested that the skid row must offer society some valuable function
such as becoming an "open asylum" where those mentally ill who are discharged
from mental institutions are placed or reside. Id. at 104-05. Another author, when
discussing the modern day rescue missions which require participation in religious
services in exchange for food and shelter, has contended that these institutions owe
their existence to continuous failure. The primary goal of these institutions, which
cater to derelicts and homeless persons, is to eradicate deviant behavior. Because
failure to attain this goal is essential to their continued functioning and expansion,
they generally depict the problem as quite severe. Rooney, Organizational Success
Through Program Failure: Skid Row Rescue Missions, 58 Soc. FoRCES 904, 921-22
(1980).
5. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1981, at 34, col. 1. A study of homeless persons who
frequented the Greenwich Village area of New York City stated that these persons
prefer to dwell in moderate income areas because they are too conspicuous and incur
the wrath of residents in the wealthier areas, but they fear the high incidence of
crime in lower income areas. Observations indicated that women have smaller
traveling and home ranges than men. Beck & Marden, Street Dwellers, 86 NAT.
HIST. 78 (1977). Public libraries in urban communities have had difficulty adjusting
to the great increase in the number of homeless and mentally disturbed persons who
are using library facilities for shelter. Urban Librarians Seek Ways to Deal with
"Disturbed Patrons," N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1981, at A16, col. 1. Recently, New York
City transit officials initiated a program to remove homeless persons who sleep or
aimlessly ride the city subways. Homeless Riding in Subways Being Taken to City
Shelters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1982, at B3, col. 5.
6. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
7. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Aug. 26, 1981)
(Final Judgment by Consent). In 1979, the Mayor of Washington, D.C. announced a
policy to provide shelter for anyone who wanted it. Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp.
941, 943 (D.D.C. 1980). A suit has been commenced to force New York City to
expand and upgrade its shelters for homeless women. Suit Seeking to Upgrade City
Shelters for Women, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at B12, col. 5.
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the Protective Services for Adults Law of the Social Services Law,
which provides for short-term involuntary protective services for en-
dangered adults.9 The inadequacy of the Protective Services Law,
however, was demonstrated dramatically by the death of a homeless
elderly woman just before she could be helped by application of the
new law.'0 This incident emphasizes the need to institute more effec-
tive means to help homeless persons in danger.
Today's homeless individual can no longer be characterized as an
elderly or alcoholic person, but is more typically unemployed or suf-
fering from a mental disability."l As a result, responses to the home-
less problem require innovative and imaginative approaches. This
Note briefly traces the historic causes of homelessness, examines the
purposes behind vagrancy and loitering statutes, and explores the
reasons why such laws have proven to be inadequate to cope with the
current dimension of the problem. The actions taken in New York
8. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 991, codified at N.Y. Soc. SFmv. LAW § 473-a (McKinney
Supp. 1981-82) (Article 9B); Should We Seize Homeless People Against Their Will?,
N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 14, 1982, at 65, col. 1. Other state adult protective services
laws are: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.10-410.11 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. §§
209.010-09.150 (1977 & Supp. 1980); MD. Soc. SERV. CODE ANN. §§ 106-110 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-101-113 (1980 & Supp. 1981); TEX. HuM. RES. CODE
ANN. § 48.061 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The Florida Adult Protective Services Act was
held to be constitutional in In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 1981).
9. For the purposes of this section, an endangered adult is a person 18 years of age
or over who is in a situation or condition which poses an imminent risk of death or an
imminent risk of serious physical harm to him or her and is lacking the capacity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of remaining in that situation or condition.
1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 991, codified at N.Y. MENTAL HYC. LAW § 473-a (i-ii) (McKin-
ney 1981).
10. Woman Refuses Aid, Dies in Carton on Street, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at
Al, col. 1. A homeless women thought to be in her late 60's was found dead of
hypothermia in her home of 8 months, a cardboard box. New York City officials said
she died "just hours before they were to obtain a State Supreme Court order to take
her forcibly to a city shelter or hospital." Id. It was the first time the city had
attempted to use the Protective Services for Adults Law. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW. §
473-a (McKinney 1981). The woman repeatedly had refused to accept help from
several private and public agencies. Id. at B6, col. 1. The city had lobbied heavily for
the state custody procedure law, primarily intended to help "elderly people suffering
in their homes and refusing help." Id. at B6, col. 2. It took a long time to obtain the
court order because it was necessary "to show the court that every effort was made"
to do it on a voluntary basis. Id. at Al, col. 3. Officials were "concerned about
[protecting] people's civil rights." Id. at B3, col. 1. A limited effort, had been made
to send vans around the city to find street dwellers, particularly "shopping bag
ladies," and persuade them to enter city shelters. Pact Requires City to Seek Homeless
Men, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at B11, col. 2.
11. See generally NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, SHELTER OUT-
REACH PROJECT: STATISTICAL REPORT (Mar. 1981) (survey of clients referred to mental
health teams at New York City's Men's and Women's Shelters).
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relating to the homeless are analyzed and suggestions which may be
applicable to all municipalities are offered. This Note concludes that
the legal doctrine of parens patriae, combined with the policies be-
hind several existing provisions of the New York State Mental Health
and Social Services Laws, is a basis upon which further additions to
the New York State Social Services should be made.
II. Historical Background
Refugees, migrant laborers, and a disproportionate share of the
lower economic strata of society historically have formed the homeless
population.1 2 This condition can be attributed to their weak social
ties, lack of education, and inability to adapt to drastic economic,
political and social changes. 13 Throughout the first half of the twenti-
eth century the number of homeless persons in the United States
fluctuated. The homeless population decreased with the commence-
ment of the First World War, but homelessness increased again after
the war due to the return of servicemen. Although the Great Depres-
sion of 1929 precipitated a massive homeless problem, New Deal
legislation and the Second World War reduced the numbers of home-
less individuals. 14 As the number of homeless individuals increased
once again, following the readjustment period after World War Two,
skid row lost its community-like atmosphere,15 and the problem
spread beyond individual neighborhoods.
English vagrancy and loitering statutes provided the basis for their
American counterparts, but the social and economic environment
from which those laws emerged had a character far different than
12. SKID Row, supra note 1, at 18. The Greek city-state of Athens provided a
welfare network for its resident poor while non-resident indigents were forced to
survive by begging in the streets. Id. During the European Middle Ages, a segment of
the population became detached from the land and roamed the countryside. Id. at
19. The devastation of the Black Death coupled with the gradual collapse of feudal-
ism, the emergence of a trading class and the increasing acceptance of the notion that
money was a source of wealth and power, released many workers from the land. M.
CHAMBERS, R. GREW, D. HERLIHY, T. RABB & I. WOLOCH, THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE
357-58 (1974). Virtually every religion, including Islam, Buddhism, and Christian-
ity, contributed to the ranks of the homeless by encouraging members to renounce
material wealth and adopt an ascetic way of life. J. Noss, MAN'S RELIGION 122, 124-
26, 455-56, 473-74, 535 (5th ed. 1974).
13. Due to the economic conditions of these groups, financial survival generally
does not permit the adequate support of an extended family. In addition, the absence
of education or acquisition of a skilled trade impedes social mobility. SKID Row, supra
note 1, at 23.
14. S. WALLACE, SKID Row AS A WAY OF LIFE 22-23 (1965).
15. SKID Row, supra note 1, at 36-39. Before World War II skid row provided a
ready source of migrant labor. S. WALLACE, SKID ROW AS A WAY OF LIFE 21 (1965).
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that which is typical of today's urban areas. Although initially English
vagrancy and loitering statutes had an economic rationale, 16 ulti-
mately they evolved into a means to prevent crime. 17 Early American
16. The labor shortage which occurred in the wake of the Black Death induced
English laborers to roam the country offering their services to the highest bidder.
Landowners offered higher wages in order to augment their depleted work forces.
Ledwith v. Roberts, 1 K.B. 232, 271 [1937]; KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW,
ch. 25, 483 (J.W.C. Turner ed, 17th ed., 1958); Note, The Vagrancy Concept
Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102,
104 (1962) [heieinafter cited as Vagrancy Reconsidered]. The emergence of a trades-
man class and the deterioration of the feudal system caused laborers to leave the fiefs
to find other jobs. SKID Row, supra note 1, at 19; Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 K.B.
232, 271. Parliament's first responses, A Statute of Labourers, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 1
(1350), and the Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1, 3, 7 (1349), compelled
laborers to remain within stated areas, and halted escalating wages by instituting a
fixed rate of pay. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 n.4 (1972);
3 S. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 267 (1882) [hereinafter
cited as A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW]; KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW ch.
25 J 483 (J.W.C. Turner ed., 17th ed., 1958); Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra at 104.
A subsequent statute which sought to quell the migration of laborers required them
to receive the King's written permission in order to travel from an individual's place
of residence. 12 Rich. 2, ch. 3 (1388); KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW ch. 25 1
483 (J.W.C. Turner ed., 17th ed., 1958). This act distinguished between able-bodied
beggars and the invalid poor who were encouraged to rely on their home parishes for
support. 12 Rich. 2, ch. 7 (1388). A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra at 268.
The government sought to prevent vagrants from becoming a "public charge,"
Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra, at 102; Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS
L.J. 237, 237 (1958) (using vagrants to work), and to protect the other members of
society. Id. In 1530, able-bodied vagrants were subjected to such sanctions as whip-
ping "till his body be bloody," scourging and bodily mutiliation, while the disabled
homeless were required to obtain a license to beg in the locality. 22 Hen. 8, ch. 12
(1530); A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra at 270. If caught begging outside the
locality, the punishment was specified as three days in the stocks on a diet of bread
and water. Id.
17. The "Slavery Acts," so called because of the two years enslavement penalty
they provided for anyone who "liveth idly and loiteringly, by the space of three
days," 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547), no longer reflected the thinking that labor shortages
caused economic havoc, but rather the hypothesis that wanderers supported themsel-
ves through the commission of criminal acts at the expense of the more economically
prosperous. Id. A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 274; Vagrancy
Reconsidered, supra note 16, at 105-06. In 1597 and 1600, during the reign of
Elizabeth I, correction houses were established in each county where able-bodied
beggars were forced to work until they were placed elsewhere or banished. 39 Eliz.
ch. 4 (1597); N. EDEN, THE STATE OF THE POOR 17-18 (1929); A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 274. Legislation passed in 1744 divided the crime
of vagrancy into three classes: idle and disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds,
and incorrigible rogues. 17 Geo. 2, ch. 5 (19744); A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 16, at 273. These acts, which signaled a shift away from legislation
intended to punish status crimes to laws which proscribed criminal conduct, 5 Geo.
4, ch. 83 (1824), are the foundations for the present English vagrancy laws. 5 Will. 4,
ch. 76 (1834); Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 K.B. 232.
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laws governing the poor and the homeless borrowed1 8 from English
law.'" The rationale behind American vagrancy statutes thus perpet-
18. The English enacted vagrancy laws with criminal and poor relief components
when they established their rule over New York in 1664. D. SCHNEIDER & A.
DEUTSCH, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE, 1867-1940 4 (1969).
Initially each parish had to levy taxes and provide for its indigents, often in alms-
houses. Id. Displacement caused by the American Revolution made it necessary for
the state to assume financial responsibility for the needy and homeless who did not
reside in a particuar town or county. Id. at 4-5. An 1824 state law required each
county to build almshouses for its poor and homeless. Id. at 6. When it became
apparent that the transfer to the counties of total responsibility for the poor was a
failure, the state began to grant greater subsidies to localities and assumed responsi-
bility for special institutions such as veterans homes, insane asylums, and homes for
the blind and juveniles. Id. at 7-8. Nevertheless, the town-county poorhouse system
remained the major source of poor relief. The many non-New York State residents
who came to New York City following the Civil War and the depression of 1876 were
provided with sleeping space in police stations where conditions posed health dangers
for the police and the lodgers. J. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE 264-66 (1970).
In reaction to the deplorable conditions, a reform movement led by Jacob Riis and
Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in establishing municipal lodg-
ing houses for the homeless and shifting the duty to provide for them from the police
to the State Board of Charities. Id. at 265; D. SCHNEIDER & A. DEUTSCH, THE
HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1867-1940 108 (1969). A compre-
hensive statute, the Poor Law, was enacted in 1896 which defined the responsibilities
of local relief officials and enlarged on the state's supervisory powers over those
officials. Id. at 130-33. A 1927 law consolidated the plethora of state agencies which
dealt with dependents into the Department of Mental Health, the Department of
Charities and the Department of Corrections. Id. at 273. In 1929, The Department
of Charities became the State Department of Social Welfare, and the Public Welfare
Law, which replaced the Poor Law, made each county a welfare district where New
York City, Kingston, Poughkeepsie, Oswego and Newburgh each became indepen-
dent welfare districts. The readjustment of power and responsibility between the
state and counties was accompanied by a greater emphasis on home relief and a
deemphasis on institutionalization in almshouses. Id. at 283-86. The state assumed a
greater financial burden for the unemployed homeless following the Depression of
1929 when local welfare districts faltered under the financial strain. Id. at 307-10.
The 1940 Social Welfare Law established the present relationship between the state
and local welfare networks which imposed a duty on the state to provide for the
indigent, poor and homeless within its borders. Id. at 374-75.
19. A 1535 law authorized church officials and two designated persons in each
parish to solicit donations for food and other necessities for the disabled poor as well
as to establish methods of providing work for the able-bodied vagrant. 27 Hen. 8, ch.
25 (1535); A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 270. During the reign
of Elizabeth I, poor law relief provisions were enacted which provided for compul-
sory assessment of taxes on a county level for the purpose of aiding the poor, homeless
and indigent. The Poor Relief Act, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2 (1601); KENNY'S OUTLINES OF
CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 25. 483 (J.W.C. Turner ed., 17th ed., 1958). Although it was
recognized that severe punishment and voluntary charity had not succeeded in
eradicating the existing problem, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at
272, severe penalties against vagrants were necessary to protect individual parishes
from new arrivals who drained the parish treasury. KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL
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uates the theory that society must have a means of removing the idle
and undesirable from its midst before their potential for criminal
activity is realized.20
The principal constitutional grounds upon which American va-
grancy statutes are attacked include violations of due process and
equal protection guarantees.2" The most common strategy employed
in attacking vagrancy provisions is to assert that the statute is void for
LAW, ch. 25, 483 (J.W.C. Turner ed., 17th ed., 1958). The 1601 Poor Law Relief
Acts were significant because they shifted responsibility for the poor and homeless to
secular institutions in order to tax and appropriate funds for almshouses and provide
for the helpless and involuntarily unemployed in their own homes. B. COLL, PERSPEC-
TIVES IN PUBLIC WELFARE 5 (1969). Nevertheless, the criminal component of the poor
laws were still status-oriented. VAGRANCY RECONSIDERED, supra note 16, at 106. In
1834, the Poor Law Amendment Bill, 5 Will. 4, ch. 76 (1834), established the Poor
Law Commission which was allowed a free hand to take steps to reduce costs because
the tax burden had become too great. M. ROSE, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 1780-1930
75, 77, 96 (1971). The Commission, in order to encourage economic independence,
declared that the government would no longer dispense home relief to the able-
bodied indigent, but would provide relief to those persons in workhouses only. The
revisions were enacted to place the non-working able-bodied vagrant at a lower
economic level than the lowest paid independent laborer. B. COLL, PERSPECTIVES IN
PUBLIC WELFARE 2-3 (1969). Two persons responsible for the philosophical motiva-
tion behind this legislation were Jeremy Bentham and T. R. Malthus, who considered
relief for the poor detrimental to the national economy. Malthus theorized that any
program designed to increase population or prevent its natural attrition was harmful.
N. EDSALL, THE ANTI-POOR LAW MOVEMENT 1834-44 1-8 (1971). See also B. COLL,
PERSPECTIVES IN PUBLIC WELFARE 9 (1969).
20. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169, 171 (1972); United States ex.
rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1974); Fenster v. Leary,
20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744 (1967); Perkins, The
Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 250 (1958). The first American vagrancy
laws were intended to prevent crime. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 161 (1972); United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1172 (2d
Cir. 1974); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Colo. 1969); Alegata v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 295-96, 231 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1967); Fenster v.
Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 313, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967).
American vagracy statutes were fashioned upon early English statutes, but while the
English law had progressed to the extent of punishing specific criminal acts, Ameri-
can law continued to punish a status or condition. Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra
note 16, at 113; See also Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in
Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 562 (1960); Perkins, The Vagrancy Con-
cept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237,254 (1958). American statutes which punish status offenses
have been declared unconstitutional. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 1969). In Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held that legislation which imposed
sanctions on the status of drug addiction violated the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. 370 U.S. at 667. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-33 (1968),
however, held that public intoxication was a crime.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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vagueness-people of ordinary intelligence are denied the right to
procedural due process because it would not be possible for them to
ascertain from the statute the particular conduct proscribed. 22 As a
corollary, this theory maintains that the statutes which provide no
reasonable guidelines for proper enforcement confer upon the police
unfettered discretion as to when and against whom the statute may be
used.2 3
Another related avenue of attack is to allege that the vagrancy
statute exceeds the permissible police powers of the state. Acting
under its police powers, the state may enact only those statutes which
bear a reasonable relationship to the promotion of the public health,
welfare, safety or good.24 These were the grounds upon which the
New York vagrancy law 25 was declared unconstitutional in Fenster v.
Leary.26 After being arrested three times within a short period for
vagrancy, the plaintiff sought an order prohibiting the court from
hearing and adjudicating the third charge. 27 The New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the statute made conduct criminal "which in
22. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Giacco v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 287 (1961); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-18 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509
(1948); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 571, 300 N.E.2d 411, 414, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33,
37 (1973). Void for vagueness is a deprivation of the fair notice requirement and
amounts to a violation of procedural due process. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
572 (1974); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261, 264 (1937).
23. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1939). Although Fenster v. Leary was not decided on
the void for vagueness grounds the New York Court of Appeals stated, "statutes
cannot stand if . . . the class of persons coming within their ambit is so vaguely
defined as to make it unclear to potential violators just what conduct will subject
them to criminal liability and what will not." (citation omitted). 20 N.Y.2d at 314,
229 N.E.2d at 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
24. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 314, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d
739, 743 (1967); People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274, 210 N.Y.S.2d
505, 507 (1961). Substantive due process prohibits arbitrary and capricious govern-
ment action and requires that any exercise of a state's police powers must bear a
rational relationship to the promotion of the public welfare, safety, and health. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (nature of civil commitment must
bear some rational relationship to the reason for such commitment).
25. N.Y. CiM. PRoc. LAW § 887 (1), repealed by 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 681, § 90.
26. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
27. This order was denied in the lower New York courts and affirmed in the New
York Court of Appeals. Fenster v. Criminal Ct. of City of N.Y., 17 N.Y.2d 641, 216
N.E.2d 342, 269 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1966). Fenster's request that a three judge panel of
the Federal Court for Southern District of New York rule on the constitutionality of
§ 887(1) was denied on the grounds that plaintiff's proper remedy was an application
to the state courts for a declaratory judgment. Fenster v. Leary, 264 F. Supp. 153,
156-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'd, 386 U.S. 10 (1967).
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no way impinges on the rights and interests of others and which has in
no way ... more than the most tenuous connection with the preven-
tion of crime and preservation of the public order . 2.. ,,28 Therefore,
the court held that the statute violated due process and amounted to
an excessive exercise of the state's police power.
Although the New York vagrancy law was repealed,2 9 in an appar-
ent attempt to circumvent Fenster v. Leary,30 New York enacted a
loitering statute 31 which included a provision that was conspicuously
similar to the unconstitutional vagrancy provision. 32  Historically,
loitering statutes had their origins in English law. They were often
incorporated within vagrancy statutes33 because the concepts of loiter-
ing 34 and vagrancy overlapped. 35 The primary purpose of such loiter-
28. 20 N.Y.2d at 312-13, 229 N.E.2d at 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 742. Other theories
of attack maintain that various vagrancy provisions violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment by establishing invidious class distinctions,
which apply only to the poor and not the affluent, Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp.
897, 906 (D. Colo. 1969); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426,
429, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744 (1967) (raised issue of "whether persons of means are
entitled any more than the poor to enjoy the allegedly debilitating effects of idle-
ness .. "); Note, Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra note 16, at 125-28, or that va-
grancy laws violate the involuntary servitude clause of the thirteenth amendment,
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744
(1967) (possible thirteenth amendment argument); Thompson v. Bunton, 117 Mo.
83, 93, 22 S.W. 863, 865 (1893). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105
(1939); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 297, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1967).
29. Repealed by 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 681.
30. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (1967) (repealed by 1978 N.Y. Laws 1978 ch.
446, § 1).
32. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir.
1974); Recent Decision, People v. Beltrand, 35 ALB. L. REV. 391, 392 (1971). "The
Code still contains dubiously constitutional vagrancy provisions, now renamed loiter-
ing .. ." Schwartz, Introduction to Note, Criminal Law Revision Through A Legis-
lative Commission: The New York Experience, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 211 (1968),
described the loitering statute as "New York's formulation of a dragnet approach to
the maintenance of public order that had its roots in feudal England and which has
survived, despite considerable disapproval, in urban America."
33. See, e.g., 1 Edw. 6, ch. 2 (1547); Vagrancy Act of 1824, 5 Geo. 4 ch. 83
(1824); Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 K.B. 232, 270; HARRs's CRIMINAL LAW 242
(McClean & Morish eds., 22d ed., 1973). In People v. Inglee, 69 Misc. 2d 1059, 332
N.Y.S.2d 81 (Warren County Ct. 1972), the court, in determining whether enforce-
ment of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6), was intended only for on the scene arrests or
whether it could be used in order to arrest for prior acts, compared this provision to
the old vagrancy statute and used cases interpreting it to decide that defendant had
been illegally detained. 69 Misc. 2d at 1060-61, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
34. One court has stated that "while the definition of the word [loitering] is clear
the concept of the offense is somewhat shapeless." People v. Nowak, 46 A.D.2d 469,
471, 363 N.Y.S.2d 142, 145 (4th Dep't 1975).
35. "To loiter is to consume time idly, to linger, to delay, to spend time in a place
in an idle manner, to travel indolently." Id. at 471, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 145. In People v.
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ing statutes was to prevent criminal acts by permitting an arrest to be
made before a crime was committed. 36  The loitering provision en-
acted after Fenster v. Leary37 prohibited a person from loitering,
remaining or wandering in or about a place without apparent reason
under circumstances which justify suspicion that he is committing or
about to commit a crime, 38 and subsequently it was held unconstitu-
tional .39
Another provision of New York's loitering statute40 which appar-
ently was directed against wandering indigents was held unconstitu-
tional in People v. Velazquez because it failed to provide any "com-
prehensive normative standard. ' 41 The statute provided that anyone
loitering or sleeping in a transportation facility who could not explain
his presence was subject to arrest. The court held that although loiter-
ing was a broad and nebulous word which meant staying or remain-
ing around a place without any purpose or aim, it was never intended
to transform innocent behavior into criminal conduct. 42 Alone, the
Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 333, 199 N.E. 501, 502 (1936), the court stated that § 887(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure "has reference to those hangers-on of society, ne-er-
do-wells, loafers who stand about our street corners and public places without visible
means of employment and refuses to work when employment can be had."
36. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972); United States
ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1974); People v.
Nowak, 46 A.D.2d 469, 471, 363 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144-45 (4th Dep't 1975). The
legislative intent behind certain loitering provisions was to prevent "nondescript
characters and 'degenerates' from infesting subway, elevated or other railway sta-
tions." People v. Merolla, 9 N.Y.2d 62, 67, 172 N.E.2d 541, 544, 211 N.Y.S.2d 155,
159 (1961); People v. Bell, 306 N.Y. 110, 113-14, 115 N.E.2d 821, 822, 115 N.Y.S.2d
821 (1953); People v. Velasquez, 77 Misc. 2d 749, 752, 354 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1974).
37. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
38. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 240.35(6) repealed by 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 446, § 1.
39. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1172 (2d Cir.
1974); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973);
People v. Bambino, 69 Misc. 2d 387, 391, 329 N.Y.S.2d 922, 927 (Nassau County Ct.
1972); People v. Villanueva, 65 Misc. 2d 484, 487-88, 318 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170-71
(Long Beach City Ct. 1971); People v. Beltrand, 63 Misc. 2d 1041, 1047, 314
N.Y.S.2d 276, 283 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970). See note 22 supra and accompanying text
for void for vagueness discussion.
40. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(7) (McKinney 1980). A person is guilty of loitering
when he: "[l]oiters or remains in any transportation facility, or is found sleeping
therein, and is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his presence.
41. 77 Misc. 2d 749, 354 N.Y.S.2d 975 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974).
42. People v. Velazquez, 77 Misc. 2d 749, 760, 354 N.Y.S.2d 975, 986 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1974). In Velazquez, the court pointed out that other loitering provisions
which restricted their ambit to specific facilities where the occurrence of criminal
activity was frequent had been held constitutional. These provisions involved areas
whose boundaries were clearly demarcated and which were open to the public for a
limited purpose only. The language of the statute in Velazquez referred to a trans-
portation facility which may encompass areas which more closely resemble a small
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word "loitering" connoted no misconduct or transgression of the law.
Therefore, in order to be a valid exercise of the police power, a
loitering statute had to specify a prohibited act.43
Vagrancy and loitering statutes with criminal sanctions have
proven to be inappropriate tools to deal with the homeless. 44  As
Fenster v. Leary stated, these provisions are used against "derelicts
and other unfortunates" 45 because their appearance and presence of-
fends the sensibilities of those outside the confines of skid row. 46 The
Fenster court indicated that the welfare laws were a more appropriate
means of solving the problem because street dwellers were not crimi-
nals. By the late 1960's, moreover, it was recognized that criminal
sanctions were not a viable solution to the homelessness problem
because they did not address the causes. As a result, while homeless
persons were sometimes arrested for trespass, 47 disorderly conduct, 48
city with streets, stores and concessions which are normally open to the general
public. Id. at 759, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
43. People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 471, 151 N.E.2d 871, 872, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313,
315 (1958).
44. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
649-50 (1956).
45. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 745 (1967).
46.
It is also obvious that today the only persons arrested and prosecuted (for
vagrancy) as common law vagrants are alcoholic dereclicts and other
unfortunates, whose only crime, if any is against themselves, and whose
main offense usually consists in their leaving the environs of skid row and
disturbing by their presence the sensibilities of residents of nicer parts of
the community, or suspected criminals, with respect to whom the authori-
ties do not have enough evidence to make a proper arrest or secure a
conviction on the crime suspected. As to the former, it seems clear that
they are more properly objects of the welfare laws and public health
programs than of the criminal law and, as to the latter, it shoud by now be
clear to our governmental authorites that the vagrancy laws were never
intended to be and may not be used as an administrative short cut to avoid
the requirements of constitutional due process in the administration of
criminal justice.
Id. at 315-16, 229 N.E.2d at 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45. One commentator stated,
"Fenster holds that the status of chronic deterioration known as vagrancy in no way
disturbs the rights or interests of others and is, therefore, beyond the functional orbit
of the criminal law." Murtagh, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORDHAM
L. REV. 51, 53 (1967). See also Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 614 (1956) (principal use of vagrancy law is to clean-up
urban "skid-row" districts).
47. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 1975), provides that "[a] person is guilty
of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises."
Proof of a trespass requires proof of the individual's actual knowledge of the illegal
conduct. See Matter of Fred H., 103 Misc. 2d 170, 425 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1980).
48. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1980) (disorderly conduct).
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and loitering violations, 49 police became reluctant to arrest homeless
persons for such violations. More frequently the police 50 make these
persons move to other locations knowing they probably will return. 51
Society, thus far, has been unable to formulate a comprehensive
strategy to deal with the problem of homelessness.52 No guidelines or
enlightening principles have been developed by which it may effec-
tively confront and react to the plight of the homeless: "The hospitals
don't want them. The courts don't want them. And if they don't ask
for help, the charities can't do anything. '" 53
III. Recent Responses in New York
Three predominant social phenomena have contributed to the enor-
mous increase in New York City's homeless population: the drastic
reduction of low-cost housing,5 4 the massive deinstitutionalization of
New York State mental hospitals over the past fifteen years 55 and
persistent and substantial unemployment.5 6  These phenomena have
49. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1980) (loitering).
50. SKID Row, supra note 1, at 229.
51. During the Democratic National Convention in August, 1980, systematic but
temporary relocation efforts by the New York City police occurred in the area near
Madison Square Garden. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 95.
52. During the depression of 1907-08 it was recognized that vagrancy was a
national problem and that previous proposals such as jailing or commitments to
almshouses had little effect. Officials also had begun to distinguish between vagrants
who sincerely sought employment and those who were indolent. Serious consider-
ation was given to the establishment of labor colonies where lazy vagrants would be
compelled to work in hopes of rehabilitation. Money was appropriated for this
reclamation effort, but the plan was never implemented. D. SCHNEIDER & A.
DEUTSCH, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK 1867-1940 200-04 (1969).
One reaction by society is to declare that those who could, or would, not provide for
themselves are schizophrenics. This gives society a convenient rationale for institu-
tionalizing these persons to undergo therapeutic treatment intended to remedy their
alleged mental illness. This attempt has been criticized as being worse than doing
nothing at all. Szasz, The Lady in the Box, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1982, at A19, col. 1.
53. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 97 (citation omitted).
54. Homeless New Yorkers: The Forgotten Among Us: Background Information
for the New York State Assembly Public Hearing on the Homeless 1 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Homeless New Yorkers]; PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at
31-32; A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN, supra note 3, at 28, 42-44; N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1981, at BI, col. 1.
55. Testimony on Shelter and Support Services for the Homeless Population,
Hearings before the Standing Committees on Mental Health, Social Service and
Housing of the New York State Assembly 1-8 (testimony of Edward I. Koch) [herein-
after cited as Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C.]; Homeless New Yorkers, supra note
54, at 1; PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 31; A STUDY OF HOMELESS
WOMEN, supra note 3, at 29-30, 35-40.
56. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 30-33; A STUDY OF HOMELESS
WOMEN, supra note 3, at 40-42.
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combined to create unprecedented numbers of homeless persons, com-
prised primarily of the mentally ill, the elderly, and the unskilled.
In the past ten years, New York City has experienced an acute
shortage of low-cost housing. The city's overall vacancy rate for rental
housing is estimated to be substantially below the optimum level. 57
Figures for low-cost housing are decidedly worse: 58 it is estimated that
the city has lost at least 31,000 single-room occupancy (SRO) units. 59
Escalating rents and the widespread conversion of rental units into
cooperative apartments have forced persons on fixed incomes 6 into
the population of homeless persons.61 Finally, because of austerity
57. Five percent is considered optimal. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note
1, at 31. According to a report prepared for the city, the vacancy rate in New York
City is 2.13%, the lowest in a decade. In 1981, of the 1.9 million apartments in New
York City, 42,000 were vacant. Manhattan's vacancy rate of 1.9% was the lowest in
the city and apartments with a monthly rental of between $200 and $249 were
extremely scarce with a city-wide vacancy rate of 1.8 %. Rate of Vacancy In Rental
Units Shows Big Drop, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1982, at B1, col. 6.
58. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 31-32; Homeless New Yorkers,
supra note 54, at 1.
59. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 11. Other estimates of
lost units reach as high as 36,000. In 1975 there were approximately 290 hotels with
rentals fees of under $50 per week for a room. Today it is estimated that there are less
than 120 hotels with rental fees under $50 per week for a room. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1982, at BI, col. 1. The New York City Administration has taken the position that the
correlation between the dramatic loss of single-room occupancy (SRO) housing units
and the increase in homeless persons is "provocative," but "simplistic" and contends
that such a relationship is not supported by empirical data. New York City's Mayor
Koch stated that only a very small percentage of displaced SRO residents require
shelter services. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 11-12; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at B4, col. 4. City Hall also disputes the validity of the figures
on lost units, asserting that the "actual number of habitable housing units lost is
much smaller than the raw figures indicate." This assertion is premised on the fact
that in 1975, 26% (nearly 13,000 units) of all SRO units were vacant because they
were uninhabitable. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 11-12.
There has been a 63% decrease in SRO units since 1975. Homeless New Yorkers,
supra note 54, at 1, which is attributed to the New York City real estate tax
abatement programs. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 54, at 1; PRIVATE LIVES/
PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 32; To Shelter The Homeless, Catholic New York,
Jan. 3, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Take Care of the Homeless, Catholic New York, Oct. 4,
1981, at 10, col. 2. Under the city's J51 program, substantial tax incentives (exemp-
tions and abatements) are granted, for periods up to 20 years, to developers who
convert low cost housing to luxury housing. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § J51-2.5
(Supp. 1981). The city states that J51 tax incentives are only "minor" contributing
factors responsible for the shortage of SRO units: 6,258 (20.3%) out of a total of
30,835 units lost since 1975 were directly attributable to J51 conversions. Testimony
of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 16-17.
60. "Escalating rents, primarily attributable to an all-time low vacancy rate . . .
[and] the wholesale co-opping in many middle and high-income as well as formerly
marginal neighborhoods are forcing many persons on fixed incomes out of the apart-
ments." Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 55, at 1.
61. Even without the J51 tax abatement program, see note 28 supra, propitious
circumstances presently exist for developers who wish to convert a low-cost hotel to
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budgets and fiscal crises on city, state and federal levels, there has
been little, if any, new construction of low-cost housing. 2
A second major cause of the homeless problem has been the mass
deinstitutionalization of mental patients from state hospitals13 coupled
with inadequate aftercare treatment and facilities. In addition, the
state has adopted stringent admission criteria which make it more
difficult for those suffering under a mental disability to gain admission
luxury or cooperative housing. Because of the extremely tight apartment market, a
developer can profit handsomely by rehabilitating or renovating an SRO hotel and
then renting units at whatever price the market will permit. Newspapers are replete
with accounts of developers and landlords engaging in unethical and illegal behavior
in an effort to force tenants out of low-rent buildings in order to begin conversion.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at B1, col. 1. On the Streets, Catholic New York, Oct. 4,
1981, at 9-10.
62. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 55, at 1. The City Council, in an effort to
counteract the unfavorable housing situation, enacted revisions to the J51 program
which included tax incentives for rehabilitation of SRO housing units. NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, J51-2.5c (Supp. 1981); Testimony of the Mayor of
N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 15-16; in addition, the city has instituted legal programs
staffed by attorneys who assist and represent SRO tenants, has allocated 2.8 million
dollars in the Community Development budget for special housing projects including
construction of SRO units, and is establishing an SRO Loan program, which proba-
bly will include 1% financing.with a maximum of 20 years to reimburse, to help
finance improvements for prolonging the useful life of an SRO facility. Testimony of
the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 14-17. Some skeptics, including community
activists, city council members, and attorneys for SRO hotel owners, have expressed
serious doubt as to whether the new provisions in the city's J51 program will be
successful in overcoming market forces which make luxury conversions so financially
attractive to developers. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at B4, col. 4. The New York
State Assembly has passed The Special Needs Housing Act, N.Y.A. 8390, and amend-
ment N.Y.A. 9208, 205th Sess. (1982), in response to the housing crisis in New York
City, which would allocate three million dollars to voluntary agencies in order to
acquire and upgrade housing for the homeless. The city fully supports the legislation
but emphasizes that the amount of money is insufficient and asks for a modification
of the legislation so that it would include new construction of low-cost housing as
well as rehabilitation. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 13-14.
Both the city and the state have recognized the need to involve the voluntary and
charitable sectors in a comprehensive and coordinated plan to alleviate the plight of
the homeless. Id. at 11. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1982, at B1, col. 2. The charitable
sector has in at least one case proven itself to be an adept and efficient manager in
these matters. The Franciscans Catholic order purchased a building in the east
midtown area for under $600,000 and thereafter renovated it in order to provide
shelter for homeless persons. Although it provides a myriad of services and charges
reasonable rents, it does not operate at a deficit. On the Streets, Catholic New York,
Oct. 4, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
63. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 54, at 1; Testimony of the Mayor of
N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 2; PRIVATE LIvEs/PuBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 31; A
STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN, supra note 20, at 35-40. Since 1965, more than 126,000
former state mental patients have been discharged in the New York City metropoli-
tan area. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 54, at 1; Private Lives/Public Spaces,
supra note 1, at 31.
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to state in-patient institutions.64  As a result, an estimated 47,000
former mental hospital patients now reside in New York City.65
An important reason for the depopulation of psychiatric facilities
was a legal theory known as the "right to treatment in the least
restrictive alternative."'6 The first instance in which the "least restric-
tive alternative" theory was applied to the mentally i1167 was Lake v.
Cameron. 68 The court ordered that alternative methods of treating
64. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 2; Homeless New
Yorkers, supra note 54, at 1; PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 31. In
addition, some state institutions have refused to admit patients with serious mental
problems even though they were direct referrals from municipal hospitals and emer-
gency rooms. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 6. In-patient
psychiatric facilities at public and private hospitals in New York City have become
severely overburdened and understaffed, id. at 5, and patient care has necessarily
suffered. Persons with chronic mental health problems who are in need of extended
care often receive brief treatment only to be released in order to make space available
for others experiencing more severe psychotic tendencies or episodes.
65. Testimony of the Mayor of N. Y. C., supra note 55, at 2; PRIVATE LIvES/PUBLIC
SPACES, supra note 1, at 31.
66. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This theory expands on
the "right to treatment" doctrine which states that involuntary hospitalization by the
state, without proper and adequate treatment, is a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. The idea was first proposed by a psychiatrist-lawyer, Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960), and was later applied by the courts.
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("The purpose of involuntary
hospitalization is treatment, not punishment."); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (mentally ill patients who are committed involuntarily
must receive the individual treatment that reasonably is calculated to improve or
cure their condition, and failure to provide adequate and effective care cannot be
excused by lack of staff personnel); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State
Hosp., 233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1968); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (mentally retarded are entitled to the same right to treatment as the
mentally ill), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderhol, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (there exists a constitutional duty on the part of the state to protect
mentally retarded persons whose confinement is not involuntary); Sas v. State of
Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964) (lack of treatment for involuntarily
hospitalized mentally ill patient may violate equal protection of the laws); Roberts,
Right to Treatment: A Pandora's Box for Law and Psychiatry, 10 CoLo. LAW. 538,
538 (1981); K. MILLER, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 38-49
(1980).
67. The foundation for the "least restrictive alternative" theory is Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), which involved an Arkansas statute requiring teachers
in state supported schools to list all organizations to which they belonged or contrib-
uted to in prior years. The Supreme Court held that the state had a legitimate and
substantial governmental purpose in investigating the qualifications and affiliations
of its teachers, but that much of what the state required had no bearing on teacher
competency. Id. at 490. Even legitimate governmental purposes "cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties" if a less drastic means of
achieving that interest is available. Id. at 488.
68. 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1982] HOMELESSNESS
individuals committed to mental institutions had to be examined and
that all alternative avenues of treatment, including discharge to com-
munity homes and half-way houses, where appropriate, be made
available in order to provide adequate care to such persons.6 9 In 1975,
the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson,70 declared that a
diagnosis of mental illness alone could not justify the indefinite deten-
tion of an individual in custodial confinement. 71 The Court held that
there was no constitutional basis for confining mentally ill persons
involuntarily if they are not dangerous to anyone and can live safely in
freedom by themselves or with the aid of others.7 2
The most serious aspect of deinstitutionalization is the inadequacy
of aftercare services made available to those discharged from state
mental hospitals. 73 Instead of providing rehabilitation, socialization
and vocational services, ex-patients often receive little or no support-
ive services designed to help them re-enter society. 4 This practice
69. Id.
70. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). A former mental patient, confined for almost fifteen
years, sued the superintendent of the mental institution for compensatory and puni-
tive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), for intentional and malicious depriva-
tion of his constitutional right to liberty. Id. at 565. A district court jury determined
that the patient was entitled to compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of
$38,000, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), and
the Supreme Court held that a "state cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or
with the help of willing and responsible family members and friends." 422 U.S. at
576.
71. 422 U.S. at 575.
72. Id. at 575-76.
73. A 1978 report to the New York State Assembly, entitled FROM THE BACK
WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON AFTERCARE TO THE STAND-
ING COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH OF THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FROM THE BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS], found that directors of state
hospitals were making mass discharges of mental patients in order to maintain
deinstitutionalization "quotas," and that a director's effectiveness was evaluated on
the basis of fulfilling his discharge quota, "regardless of whether the discharged
patients were ready to go and regardless of where they went." Id. at 5. The Subcom-
mittee suggested that attempts be made to locate those deinstitutionalized patients,
id. at 10, "who were precipitously discharged," and to "offer them the opportunity to
return to the hospital for fuller treatment .... " Id. at 5. One witness testified that
because of the lack of aftercare many patients were worse off after release than if
they had remained in an institution. Id. at 6. Many discharged patients are greeted
acrimoniously by community residents and the Subcommittee blamed the state for
this because of its lack of effort and expenditure in establishing adequate community
residences and the required aftercare programs. Id. at 6, 10. The practice of "dump-
ing" or discharging many psychiatric patients within a particular locale without
providing for gradual acclimation into the community, combined with complete
absence of perfunctory aftercare services, has been prevalent since 1968. Id. at 7.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1981, at B24, col. 4.
74. This practice of "dumping" discharged mental patients into an area without
providing aftercare programs has aroused great hostility and alienation in many
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contravenes the right of a person to receive treatment in the least
restrictive alternative consonant with a patient's needs because it fails
to provide any course of treatment at all.7"
communities. FROM THE BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS, supra note 73, at 7, 16.
See generally Segal, Sheltered Care Needs of the Mentally Ill, 4 HEALTH AND SOC.
WORK 41 (1979). On numerous occasions, patients have been discharged to SRO units
with no provision for aftercare. FROM THE BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS, supra
note 73, at 14. The SRO units are disappearing at a rapid rate which, it is estimated,
will make them extinct by 1984. The city has proposed as one of the requirements of
the SRO Loan program, see note 36supra, that wherever "feasible," the owner,
making improvements, must set aside space in the hotel for use by "on-site" workers
who would deliver various social services and administer aftercare programs. Testi-
mony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 17. Cohen, Sichel, & Berger, The
Use of a Mid-Manhattan Hotel as a Support System, 13 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
J. 76, 76 (1977) (concludes that by organizing and using present community resources
in a SRO-hotel setting it is possible to arrest the "revolving door" syndrome of single-
room occupancy unit to city hospital to state hospital and to provide an alternative to
long-term hospitalization).
75. FROM THE BACK WARD TO THE BACK ALLEY, supra note 73, at 7. "Deinstitu-
tionalization without aftercare is abandonment." Id. at 33. Many severely ill patients
have been forced to struggle, alone and unaided, with many of the same problems
which caused or aggravated their initial illness. Among the reasons for the failure of
deinstitutionalization in New York have been, first, the lack of a major financial
committment from state and federal governments for aftercare, community facilities
and services, id. Second, on the state level, there has been inadequate reallocation of
funds from the large state institutions to smaller community aftercare residences and
programs, despite the release of large numbers of state hospital in-patients, id. at 33,
51. State in-patient mental health facilities continue to receive between 80 and 90%
of present, total, budgeted allocations for mental health care, while delivering
services to a vastly reduced population. Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra
note 55, at 2, 6. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 54, at 5. Less than 20 % of the
budgeted allocation is given to local facilities for aftercare programs. It is estimated
that between 1977 and 1981 New York State spent 3.459 billion dollars to care for
approximately 25,000 patients in its in-patient hospitals. This represents less than 8 %
of all persons served by the state and local mental health systems combined. Testi-
mony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 3. The failure to reapportion funds
to reflect the changes may be attributable to a misconception on the part of New
York State fiscal officers and the New York State Office of Mental Health. These
officials view deinstitutionalization as a convenient device to reduce the economic
responsibilities of New York State. They do not realize that deinstitutionalization
would be just as costly as institutionalization if carried out in accordance with
current legal standards and with provision of required aftercare services. FROM THE
BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS, supra note 73, at 33. Third, no transitional
programs designed to ease the adjustment process of former patients to independent
life have been provided. Id. at 49. Finally, there has been a failure to provide safe
and adequate housing for discharged patients and to fund private organizations
sufficiently in order to become important sources of aftercare services. Id. at 49-50.
On the Streets, Catholic New York, Oct. 4, 1981, at 9, col. 1. Bureaucratic delays in
providing funds to private organizations for the purpose of establishing community
residences for discharged patients are formidable obstacles. Rather than encouraging
involvement by the private sector, the present allocation procedures seem to discour-
age the efforts of private organizations. FROM THE BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS,
supra note 73, at 50.
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A third cause of the increase in the number of homeless persons is
the strained economic climate of the past ten years and the resulting
increase in the ranks of the unemployed. 7  Historically, economic
recessions and depressions have added to the number of unemployed
77
and consequently the number of homeless persons. Unemployment
not only causes a strain on family relations but, in extreme cases, can
lead to detachment from all social bonds and affiliations.78 If social
isolation occurs at the same time that unemployment insurance bene-
fits have ceased, circumstances may force a person to become home-
less. Homelessness is often permanent because it generally is necessary
to have a home, clean clothes, and the ability to maintain a reason-
able level of personal appearance and hygiene in order to obtain
steady employment.
The decreased availability of low-cost housing, the deinstitutionali-
zation of psychiatric facilities, and prolonged periods of unemploy-
ment have combined to cause a homelessness problem of significant
proportions in New York.79 The severity of the problem, however, has
spurred efforts to provide new solutions which take into account the
modern characteristics of homeless persons.
A. Consent Decree
The New York State Constitution, the New York State Social Serv-
ices Law, and the New York City Administrative Code impose upon
state and city government a duty to provide shelter for the homeless.
The New York State Constitution grants to the state legislature the
authority and the duty to provide aid, care and support to the needy.80
76. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 54, at 1; PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES,
supra note 1, at 32-33; A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN, supra note 3, at 40-41.
77. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
78. A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN, supra note 3, at 42; PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC
SPACES, supra note 1, at 33.
79. Research indicates that homelessness is usually caused by an immediate pre-
cipitating event. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 34-43. Such an event
often forces someone clinging to a tenuous social bond or existing on the brink of
homelessness to become homeless. The precipitating event is often eviction or the
threat of eviction or patterns of systematic harassment employed by landlords and
developers; uninhabitable housing conditions; substantial rent increases or lack of
aftercare services. Detachment from family or stabilizing social organizations and
contacts, loss of income due to unemployment, and cessation of welfare or relief
benefits, or major theft have also been recognized as traumatic catalyzing events. Id.
80. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. The New York Court of Appeals has stated that
the New York State Constitution imposes an affirmative duty to provide care and
assistance to the needy. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451-52,
400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730-31 (1977); Matter of Hudson v. Sipprell, 76 Misc. 2d 684, 687,
351 N.Y.S.2d 915, 920 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1974).
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Pursuant to its constitutional power, the legislature enacted provisions
in the Social Services Law which require the state to provide adequate
treatment and care to those unable to care for themselves, 81 with the
ultimate goal of restoring such persons to a state of independence. 82 It
has been argued that because homeless persons in New York City need
assistance in the form of decent housing, they satisfy the statutory
requirements of the New York State Social Services Law and hence are
entitled to decent shelter. 83
A public welfare official may use community resources such as non-
profit, private agencies to provide assistance and services to needy
persons wherever they reside. 84 In addition, each local welfare dis-
trict is required to provide care and assistance to all such persons
found within its territory and can expect reimbursement for expenses
incurred as a result of these services from the state.85 However, the
duty of the local welfare district is not contingent upon reimburse-
ment from the state but rather the duty stands on its own and must be
fulfilled regardless of state reimbursement.86 Finally, the New York
City Administrative Code 81 provides that it is the duty of the superin-
tendent of any municipal lodging to give to any homeless or needy
person who applies, free food and lodging for a night. 88 Both New
York City and New York State are thus under a statutory duty8 to
provide care and assistance to those unable to care for themselves.
81. N.Y. Soc. Smv. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 1976). This requirement is condi-
tional on the availability of adequate funding. Id.
82. Id. The state must attempt to keep together any families receiving such care.
Id. § 131(3).
83. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum, at 35-41, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Jan. 16, 1981).
84. N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 1976).
85. Id. §§ 62(1) & (2).
86. Matter of Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 54-55, 332 N.E.2d 303, 309-10, 371
N.Y.S.2d 422, 431 (1975); Matter of Szanto v. Dumpson, 77 Misc. 2d 392, 395, 353
N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974); Matter of Lawson v. Shuart, 67
Misc. 2d 98, 99, 323 N.YS.2d 488, 490 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971); Ross v.
Barbaro, 61 Misc. 2d 147, 149, 304 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943-44 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1969).
87. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 24 § 604-1.0 (b) (1978).
88. In Callahan v. Carey, plaintiff's trial memorandum argued that the denial of
decent housing for the homeless violated the equal protection clauses of both the state
and federal constitutions by arbitrarily discriminating against applicants for shelter
and according preferential treatment to persons receiving home relief benefits. Plain-
tiff's Trial Memorandum at 41, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County) (Jan. 16, 1981).
89. New York City is required to provide the homeless with food and lodging
under § 604.1.0(b) of the New York City Administrative Code. Because Social
Services Law § 65(3) designates the commissioners of local social service agencies as
agents for the state, local city agencies must comply with § 131 (1) of the Social
Services Law.
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In 1979, a suit was brought on behalf of six homeless men who
claimed that they had a right to receive safe and decent shelter in
accessible locations from the New York State and New York City
governments. 0 The court stated, in granting plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, that the New York State Constitution, 1 the
New York Social Services Law, 92 and the New York City Administra-
tive Code 3 entitled the plaintiffs to "board and lodging" and required
"those public officials responsible for caring for the needy to find such
lodgings. 94
A consent decree 95 was entered into a year and a half later which
required that the city provide shelter 96 and board to every eligible
homeless man 97 who applies for it. The decree requires the establish-
90. The defendants were the Governor of New York State, the New York State
Department of Social Services Commissioner, the Mayor of New York City, the New
York City Human Resources Commissioner and the Director of the Men's Shelter in
New York City.
91. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII § 1.
92. N.Y. Soc. SEiv. LAW §§ 62(1), 131(1),(3) (McKinney 1976). See also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-272 (1975); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 400.14(a&b) (Supp.
1981-82).
93. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 24, § 604.1.0(b).
94. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec.11, at 10, col.5 (Sup. Ct. 1979). In addition
the defendants were ordered to submit a plan to provide at least 750 beds "for the
helpless and hopeless men of the Bowery .. " These beds were to be in addition to
those beds and services provided at the Men's Shelter and its satellites. Id.
95. The consent decree was agreed to without adjudication of any issue of fact or
law. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Aug. 26, 1981) (Final
Judgment by Consent) [hereinafter cited as Final Judgment].
96. The consent decree promulgates unambiguous health, safety and security
standards for both the shelters and Bowery hotels which the city uses and requires
that each person who enters a city-run shelter be provided with a clean, substantially
constructed bed, a clean and comfortable mattress and pillow, clean sheets, blanket,
pillow cases, toilet tissue, a change of bed clothing for each new individual and a
change of bed linen at least once a week, a lockable storage compartment, two staff
attendants for every 100 sheltered men, a staff member trained in first aid on duty at
all times, and a minimum number of group recreation hours. Final Judgment, supra
note 95, at 3-4. The hotels which the city uses to shelter homeless men must comply
with the above bedding and bed clothing requirements, and additionally, must
provide shower facilities, adequate supervision, towels, soap, a secure storage com-
partment, and must be kept clean and in compliance with the New York City heating
requirements for rental dwellings. Final Judgment, supra note 95, at 3-9.
97. Although the Consent Decree explicitly affirms a homeless man's right to
shelter, the city recognizes that homeless women also have this right. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1981, at Bll, col. 3. But see Suit Seeking to Upgrade City Shelters for
Women, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at B12, col. 5. In order to be eligible to enter the
shelter the applicant must meet the New York State need standard for home relief or
be in need of temporary shelter due to physical, mental or social dysfunction. Final
Judgment, supra note 95, at 3. New York City provides temporary shelter for
homeless families in various hotels and renovated apartment houses. Homeless fami-
lies are easier to monitor, track and relocate than homeless single persons because
they generally come from an established address, often are receiving public assistance
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ment of additional intake centers98 to accept applicants for shelter and
also provides for either direct transportation or adequate fare and
directions to the shelters from these centers. In addition, the city must
provide, at all shelters, information concerning additional benefits to
which homeless persons may be entitled."9
One significant aspect of the consent decree is that it provides for
outside monitoring and verification of compliance with the regula-
tions and standards. It grants plaintiffs' counsel access to all the city
operated facilities and the city's records concerning the operation of
the shelters. 00 This provision has been very important because there
has been a continuous effort to implement and enforce those rights.
On several occasions, litigation has been necessary to determine which
measures must be undertaken to achieve compliance with the consent
decree,' 0 1 although this is a time consuming and expensive oversight
procedure. 102 The city was once ordered to open immediately an
payments and thus have an on-going relationship with a social worker and generally
are perceived by the public as less threatening than single homeless persons. The city
has experienced problems maintaining habitable living conditions and adequate
security in the shelters it owns and in those hotels and apartments privately owned
and used to house homeless families. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at BI, col. 5.
98. The consent decree requires that the Men's Shelter on Third Street accept
applications for shelter 24-hours a day, seven days a week, that the Eighth Avenue
shelter accept applications from 5:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. seven days a week and that
additional satellite intake centers at Harlem Hospital, Kings County Hospital Center,
Lincoln Hospital and Queens Hospital Center accept applications all day Monday
through Friday. Final Judgment, supra note 95, at 9-11.
99. Id. at 11.
100. The monitoring provisions require the Commissioner of the New York City
Human Resources Administration to appoint employees to inspect all intake and
shelter facilities and to submit a written report twice a month to the Commissioner.
The provision provides for complete access for plaintiff's counsel to all facilities and
records concerning compliance with the decree and for inspections at least three
times per week by the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources
Administration of all hotels used by the city to shelter homeless men together with
written reports of such inspections. Final Judgment, supra note 95, at 11-13.
101. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1981, at B12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at B3,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1981, at Bi, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,1981, at B1,
col. 5.
102. In the past, in order to enforce a provision of the consent decree it was
necessary to return to State Supreme Court and request relief. Besides being unneces-
sarily time-consuming, it was an expensive course of action. An administrative
counsel should be established with the primary function of administering the provi-
sions of the consent decree. Utilizing informal and flexible procedures, an adminis-
trative judge could arbitrate disputes and render an opinion within 24 hours. The
counsel would either adopt or reject the recommendation of the administration law
judge concerning the issue in dispute. Final decisions of the counsel would be review-
able by the supreme court, according to the substantial evidence test. The substantial
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empty school to house the homeless temporarily because of over-
crowding at other facilities. 10 3  It also was ordered to establish a
comprehensive plan for shelters which adhered to the requirements of
the consent decree 10 4 and to identify beds which could be made imme-
diately available in order to accommodate increasing numbers of
homeless applicants.10 5
The consent decree does not require the city to operate community
shelters. Placement of shelters 06 is left to the discretion of city officials
who favor larger institutions located far from residential communities
and the greatest concentrations of homeless persons. 107 New York City
officials, faced with budgetary constraints, must balance the eco-
nomic burden of maintaining shelters with the impact they will have
on the communities.10 8 According to the city, the larger institutions
evidence test is used by reviewing courts to determine if an agency's action is the
result of careful collection, evaluation and correlation of all the important facts and
issues involved. A court could reverse an agency decision if it were determined that
the agency finding was not supported by substantial evidence or was unreasonable.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (E) (1976). Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951) (reviewing court must consider the entire record); Con Edison v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938); I.C.C. v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912);
Matter of Stork Rest., Inc., 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E. 247 (1940).
103. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at B3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Oct 22, 1981, at BI,
col. 6, B10, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1981, at B1, col. 5.
104. N.Y. Times Nov. 28, 1981, at 25, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1981, at B1
col. 5.
105. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1981, at 25, col. 6. Plaintiffs' attorneys have charged
that the city has underestimated the numbers of homeless persons who exercise their
rights and that the city relies on temporary space in armories and old schools which
do not comply with the specified terms of the consent decree. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1981, at B12, col. 3. The sheltering of homeless persons in ill-suited temporary
facilities is not a new phenomenon. When an economic depression in 1913-15 caused
the homeless population to increase dramatically, there were not enough beds at the
municipal lodging houses to accomodate all those applying for shelter, and provisions
at these houses were inadequate. Temporary shelter was erected on a pier on the East
River, but this still was inadequate and some of the homeless demanded to be
sheltered in churches. Federal authorities eventually intervened and allowed New
York City to use several of the buildings on Ellis Island to shelter the overflow of
homeless persons. J. SCHNEIDER & A. DEUTSCH, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN
NEw YORK STATE 1867-1940 211-14 (1969).
106. See New York City Human Resources Administration: Family and Adult
Services, the Homeless in New York: The City's Program (1981), and Homeless New
Yorkers, supra note 54, at 4, for descriptions of the various city run shelters.
107. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at B3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1981, at B1,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
108. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at Bll, col. 5; Testimony of the Mayor of
N.Y.C., supra note 55, at 10-11.
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are more financially feasible than the smaller, residential shelters, 10
but the perceived impact of the larger shelters on the surrounding
community is much greater. Indeed, governmental proposals to place
large shelters in or near various communities has often evoked opposi-
tion." 0
The consent decree also requires that the city and the state provide
shelter to any homeless person who applies, but because of the high
percentage of mentally ill persons who comprise the homeless popula-
tion," ' many persons are unable to make rational choices about their
109. The city's cost estimates as of June 5, 1981 for various size facilities are as
follows:
Total Per person
No. of beds Operating cost Start up cost cost per day
25 $433,050 $38,000 $47.46
50 $573,085 $49,500 $31.40
100 $834,460 $76,000 $22.86
400 $1,954,000 - $13.38
Internal Memorandum from Stephen Crystal, Director of the Bureau of Management
Systems, Planning, Research and Evaluation, to Robert Trobe, Deputy Administra-
tor, Family and Adult Services, the New York City Human Resources Administration
(June 5, 1981).
110. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1981, at B12, col. 4 (comments of State Sen. Gary L.
Ackerman); N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1981, at 26, col. 1 (a major general of the army
objects to this use of armories); Testimony of the Mayor of N.Y.C., supra note 55, at
10-11; ("[n]early everyone feels that more should be done for the homeless, but in
someone else's neighborhood"). On several occasions the city has exacerbated this
volatile situation by failing to consult with community leaders before opening a new
shelter in their area or by sureptitiously opening a shelter under cover of darkness and
confronting local residents with the new shelter the next morning. N.Y. Times, Dec.
2, 1981, at B8, col. 3-4. A New York State Subcommittee on Mental Health chastised
the state mental health system for failing to cooperate with local communities, for
opening facilities for discharged patients without community involvement and for
often deliberately concealing the facts from the public. From the Back Wards to the
Back Alleys, supra note 73, at 9. New York State advocates the establishment of
smaller community residences for the homeless, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at Bll,
col. 5, and reportedly has some citizen support. Community Boards 2, 6 and 8
support a proposal that would place small residential facilities for the homeless in
their communities. On the Streets, Catholic New York, Oct. 4, 1981, at 9, col. 3. See
also PRVATE LivEs/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 124; N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1982, at
B8, col. 3; N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 19, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
111. Shelter staff members have estimated that up to 80% of their clients have
serious mental problems. Homeless New Yorkers, supra note 23, at 2; PRvFATE LIvES/
PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 9-10, 44-45. In February, 1981 a team of psychiatrists
and psychologists were sent to various New York City shelters by the New York State
Office of Mental Health to collect data and assist those homeless who suffered from
varying degrees of mental illness. They reported that of the 355 persons they saw, 190
(53%) were diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, 35 (10%) suffered from
major affective disorders, 11 (3%) from organic brain syndrome, 33 (9%) from
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own well-being. 112 These persons effectively are precluded from exer-
cising their right to shelter because of their mental disabilities. In
addition, the reputation of the shelters as crime-plagued, inhospita-
ble, uninhabitable institutions which lack basic hygienic necessities,
deters many potential applicants. 113
B. Protective Services For Adults
In 1981, the New York State Legislature enacted a new article of
the Social Service Law" 4 which authorizes short term involuntary
protective services for persons who are adjudged to be in imminent
danger of death or serious physical harm and who lack the capacity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of their condition. The law
developed from a report" 5 which observed that those most in need of
personality disorders, 2 (1 %) from neurotic disorders, 18 (5 %) from other psychotic
disorders and 28 (8%) from a primary diagnosis of alcoholism. N.Y.S. Office of
Mental Health, Shelter Outreach Project: Statistical Report (Mar. 1981).
112. Some researchers state that a common assumption of many persons who
provide services to the homeless is that a substantial segment of the homeless popula-
tion suffer under such severe mental disabilities that they lack the capacity to seek
and obtain shelter or services. These researchers disagree with this assumption and
surmise that because of the indecent, violent conditions of many of the shelters, many
homeless people are in fact exercising reasonable judgment by remaining on the
streets rather than accept such shelter, PRIVATE LIvEs/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at
103-04.
113. Some of the less attractive conditions which existed in the New York City
shelter system included: degrading admissions processes, vermin infestation, staff
violence arising out of fear inflicted on clients, harrassment, sexual exploitation,
theft, assault and the large numbers of persons suffering from severe mental and
physical disabilities. PRIVATE LIvEs/PUBLIc SPACES, supra note 1, at 50-63.
114. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 991, codified at N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAW § 473-a (McKinney
Supp. 1981). This statute is intended to address situations in which an adult is
confronted by an imminent risk of death or serious physical harm and refuses or is
incapable of appreciating the consequences of the circumstances or where a depen-
dent adult is being abused by relatives and lacks the capability of protecting and
providing for himself. Administrative Directive from Barbara Blum, Commissioner
of the Department of Social Services, to The Commissioners of Social Services,
concerning 1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 991: Short-term Involuntary Protective Services
Orders (Dec. 11, 1981). Similar statutes in other states are: FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 410.10-410.11 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 209.010-09.150 (1977 & Supp.
1980); MD. Soc. SERV. CODE ANN. §§ 106-10 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-101-
113 (1980 & Supp. 1981); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.061 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
The Florida Adult Protective Services Act was held to be constitutional in In re
Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 1981).
115. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE BY THE NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS
(Mar. 1980). During the 1960's, it was recognized that there was little legal protec-
tion for the personal rights of mentally and physically disabled adults. However, the
legislation passed by Congress in response did not meet the growing need for adult
protective services during the 1970's. In 1974, Congress enacted Title XX of the
Social Security Act, Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88
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protective services did not come within the ambit of existing involun-
tary protective provisions."I6 In addition, the common law doctrine of
parens patriae, which authorizes social service agents to intervene on
behalf of the physically disabled, was not understood and not invoked
for fear of committing civil rights violations."17  It was necessary,
therefore, to provide social service officials with statutory authority to
provide involuntary protective services and immunity from civil lia-
bility.118
The law allows a local social services official to initiate a special
proceeding in order to provide protective services for an individual
Stat. 2337 (1974), which provided federal financial aid and required that each state
provide the necessary protective services for adults. K. CARTY & D. EMLING, OFFICE
OF PLANNING, BUDGET AND EVALATION, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
ADULT PROTECTIVE SERvICES 2-3 (Apr. 1980); REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE BY THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS
1-2 (Mar. 1980); NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, PROTECTIVE
SERvIcES FOR ADULTS 1-2 (Mar. 1981). In 1979, the New York State Legislature passed
1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 446, which amended N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131-1 (renumbered§ 473 by 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 991 § 2), and required social services officials to provide
protective services, in accordance with state and federal regulations, to or for indi-
viduals without regard to income who are mentally and physically unable to care for
themselves. Protective services include: arranging for medical, psychiatric, commit-
ment, guardianship, conservatorship or other protective services when necessary to
safeguard the interests of persons suffering from serious impairment; providing assist-
ance to individuals who must relocate because of the hazardous conditions in which
they dwell; coordination and planning with the courts and local social service agen-
cies to facilitate effective dispensation of services to those with serious disabilities;
and submission by each local department of social services of an annual plan for the
provision of adult protective services. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 473(b)&(c) (McKinney
Supp.1981). Section 473(3) provides authorized social service agents, in exercising
their duty in accordance with the section and acting within the scope of employment,
with immunity from any civil liability unless such liability arises from the willful act
or gross negligence of the official. Section 473(2) requires the establishment of an
inter-agency task force on protective services to study and recommend inter-agency
agreements, jurisdictional guidelines and other measures to improve adult protective
services on a local and county level. Among the principle recommendations of this
inter-agency task force was a proposal for legislation which would permit authorized
social service agents to initiate legal procedures to protect uncooperative seriously
impaired adults from harm. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE BY THE
STATE TASK FORCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR
ADULTS ii-iii, 9-13 (Mar. 1980).
116. Id. at iii, 9.
117. Id. at 10-11, 30 & Add. B. The report stressed the importance of permitting
authorities to act when swift action was necessary to prevent harm from occurring to
a person in need of help. Id. See notes 126-38 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the parens patriae doctrine. The reluctance of authorities to act on, behalf of
homeless street dwellers is well documented. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1982, § 1, at
34, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at Al, Col. 1. But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,
1982, at B3, col. 1.
118. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 446, § 1311(3). REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE BY THE STATE TASK FORCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, PROTECT-
IVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS 10-11 (Mar. 1980).
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who faces a risk of imminent death or serious physical harm and who
lacks the capac'ity to comprehend the probable consequences of re-
maining in that situation."" The protective service is valid for 72
hours, with a 72 hour extension possible. The person who allegedly is
in need of these services must be given notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and the effective assistance of counsel before the imposition of
services. 120  The legislation was intended'12 to provide local social
service agents with the legal means for dispensing, without fear of
legal liability, limited relief to uncooperative but needy persons and to
protect the due process rights of the homeless person.
1 22
119. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 473-a(l)(a)(i). The local official must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is indeed in danger and incapable of
comprehending the severity of his or her plight. Id. § 473-a(9).
120. But see In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 1981) (the requirements for
civil commitment proceedings are inapplicable to life-threatening emergency situa-
tions).
121. Governor's Memorandum (N.Y.A., 7585A, 204th Sess.), reprinted in [1981]
N.Y. Laws 2641 (McKinney).
122. The provision of involuntary services of any kind is a serious matter.
This bill does, however, address and accomodate the concerns expressed
by groups interested in the safeguarding of civil liberties; it represents a
sincere attempt to balance the individual's rights of self-determination
and privacy with the obligation of the State to preserve and protect the
life and health of its citizens.
Governor's Memorandum (N.Y.A. 7585 A, 204th Sess.), reprinted in [1981] N.Y.
Laws 2641 (McKinney). See REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE BY THE
STATE TASK FORCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR
ADULTS 9-11 (Mar. 1980); NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, PRO-
TECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS 20 (Mar. 1981). The Florida Adult Protective Services
Act., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.10-410.11 (Supp. 1982), authorizes health services
officials "to take elderly persons into custody and transport them to a medical or
protective service facility in an emergency situation without their consent," In re
Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 1981), "if they are likely to incur a substantial risk of
life-threatening physical harm or deterioration if not immediately removed from the
premises .. " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.104(2). The law withstood a due process
constitutional challenge for several reasons. Id. First, two government agents from
different agencies "must personally observe the emergency situation," and, subject to
a 48 hour waiting period to determine whether there is probable cause for protective
services, a court order is necessary to impose relocation. Id. A substantial risk of life-
threatening harm or deterioration must be proved. Id. The purpose of the statute is
not to impose incarceration, but to free persons from dangerous or oppressive condi-
tions. Id. Finally, the statute applies only in emergency situations. Id. The court
concluded that "[d]ue process . . . is not offended by a temporary loss of liberty
when a person's life may be threatened." Id. at 385-86. See Fhagen v. Miller, 29
N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). In
an emergency situation, careful consideration of the possible benefits that may be
received by the individual is not possible. Indeed, the balancing would involve
weighing the deprivation of liberty against the potential harm that may occur if the
individual is not taken into custody. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1221 n.106 (1974).
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There are several shortcomings to this law. An order authorizing
protective services may be initiated by social services officials and not
police officers, who are closer to the problem on a more continuous
basis.123 In addition, it presumes that those requiring assistance re-
main stationary, which is not always true of a homeless street dweller.
In all cases a protracted procedure, including a pre-custodial hearing,
is necessary to protect the due process rights of the person involved. 12 4
Finally, the Protective Services Law does not permit the use of an
"exigent circumstances"'' 25 rationale to aid someone in immediate dan-
ger of harm.
123. N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 473-a(4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1982, at B6, col. 1. See note 152 infra.
124. Upon referral of a homeless person's case, a Protective Services for Adults
(PSA) case worker makes an investigation and evaluation of the adult in question. If
this adult is in need of protective services, efforts must be made to provide the
necessary services voluntarily and in accordance with the doctrine of treatment in the
least restrictive alternative manner. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1982, at BI, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1982 at 1, col. 3. See notes 39-45 supra and accompanying text for
"least restrictive alternative" discussion. If this person, who allegedly requires pro-
tective services, refuses such services and is an endangered adult as defined by N.Y.
Soc. SEmv. LAW § 473-a 1 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1981), then the caseworker must
make reasonably diligent efforts to obtain and commit to writing all the circum-
stances surrounding the need for protective services, including detailed information
on the refusal of voluntary services. This report must then be reviewed by a supervi-
sor. Should the supervisor agree with the caseworker's determination, the informa-
tion is given to the agency or county attorney who, after reviewing the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence, prepares the appropriate court petition, which then must be
approved and signed by the commissioner of the agency or his designee and submit-
ted to the court. The court then issues an order to show cause, returnable within 48
hours, why appropriate protective services should not be executed on behalf of the
allegedly endangered adult. Within the 48 hour period, a hearing is held to deter-
mine if the material allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Administrative Directive from Barbara Blum, Commissioner of
the New York State Department of Social Services, to the Commissioners of Social
Services, concerning Short Term Involuntary Protective Services Orders 4-8 (Dec. 11,
1981).
125. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (the serious nature of an offense
under investigation does not by itself create exigent circumstances absent an emer-
gency situation threatening life or limb or an indication that evidence would be lost,
removed or destroyed before a search warrant could be obtained); Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search upheld based on the rationale of exigent
circumstances in order to prevent the destruction of evidence in a murder case); Vale
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970) (exigent circumstances exception may autho-
rize a warrantless search where evidence is in the process of being destroyed); United
States v. Haley, 581 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978);
United States v. McKinney, 477 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Rubin,
474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973); United States v.
Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1972); People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d
607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892
(1973); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 369, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972),
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IV. Vehicles to Effectuate Change
Progressive legal measures such as the consent decree and the New
York Protective Services Law have been implemented to deal with the
plight of the homeless. These recent responses indicate an awareness
of the severity of the problem and a willingness to employ innovative
and creative strategies to alleviate it. However, further efforts are
necessary. The doctrine of parens patriae allows state legislatures to
enact provisions which could improve the condition of the homeless
by enhancing the effect of the recent legal responses. 126
Parens patriae is the inherent power, vested in the state, to protect
the person and property of someone suffering under a disability.1
2 7
The courts and commentators are generally in accord when they view
parens patriae as a concept wholly separate from the police powers of
the state. 128  Measures enacted under the parens patriae power are
"parental" in nature rather than criminal and the penalties and
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973). See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 260.5 (1975).
An officer who has reasonable cause to believe that premises or a vehicle
contain
1. individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm;
... may, without a search warrant, enter and search such premises and
vehicles, and the individuals therein, to the extent reasonably necessary for
the prevention of such death, bodily harm or destruction.
126. "[T]he state has the authority to exercise its parens patriae power when it
appears . . .persons [approximating legal incompetency] are incapable of caring for
themselves." In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla. 1981). Emergency imposition of
protective services under parens patriae would be appropriate where there is proba-
ble cause to believe that the individual will suffer severe physical injury if not
immediately detained and that the person is incapable of evaluating that danger.
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1190, 1221 n.106 (1974). See also id. at 1245 n.231 (stricter standard must be met
when invoking police power).
127. "The doctrine of parens patriae ... may be defined as the inherent power
and authority of a Legislature of a state to provide protection of the person and
property of persons non sui juris, such as minors insane and incompetent persons."
McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okl. 1, 9, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922); Warner Bros. Pictures v.
Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 1947). This doctrine is of ancient origin
having been observed in the Roman Law of the Twelve Tables and it was adopted in
England as the direct prerogative of the King. In re Sariyanis, 173 Misc. 881, 883, 19
N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940); Matter of Colah, 3 Daly 529 (N.Y.
Common Pleas 1871). The King had custody because his subject was incapable of
adequately governing himself or his lands. Tourson's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 17a, 77 E.R.
730, 731 (1610) ("jure protectionis suai Regiae'). Upon achieving independence, the
prerogative of the crown passed to the people of the United States. In re Turner, 94
Kan. 115, 120, 145 P. 871, 872 (1915); Matter of Colah, 3 Daly 529, 537 (N.Y.
Common Pleas 1871); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950).
128. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, J., concur-
ring); McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okl. 1, 10, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922); In re Turner, 94 Kan.
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stigma of criminal actions do not attach. The state has both a right
and a duty to do whatever is most conducive to the interests of one
suffering from a disability. 12 Parens patriae dictates that a state must
intervene to protect those who are unable to make vital decisions in
their best interest. The state's duty includes providing for the physical
well-being of the disabled and applying the available scientific and
medical resources to restore both sound mind and body.130 It extends
to situations where a person could become a danger to himself or
others and therefore is in need of protective custody. 131 Nevertheless,
the individual's right to be free must be balanced with his need for
treatment. 132
The parens patriae power has been invoked in a variety of situa-
tions, but principally it has been used to administer care and services
to incompetents, 133 minors 134 and the insane. Courts have exercised
this aspect of the parens patriae power to order the removal of a
respirator from a patient deemed incompetent to assert his own
rights. 3- In addition, courts have invoked the parens patriae power
in the administration and application of charitable gifts and trusts, 13
115, 120, 145 P. 871, 873 (1915); Bartol, Parens Patriae Poltergiest of Mental Health
Law, 3 L. & Pol'y Q. 191, 195 (1981); Developments in the Law-Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV, L. REV. 1190, 1207-22 (1974).
129. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1947); Matter of Colah, 3 Daly 529, 537 (N.Y. Common Pleas 1871); Smith v. Smith
3 Ark. 304, 26 E.R. 977 (1745).
130. Matter of Colah, 3 Daly 529, 537 (N.Y. Common Pleas 1871). "In respect to
his person, that he is maintained as comfortably as his unfortunate situation will
[permit] of" and that "everything is done that can be done by care, skill and medical
treatment, to promote his general health, or which will or may contribute to restora-
tion of his reason." Id.
131. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955).
132. In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 756, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 120, 145 P. 871, 873 (1915).
133. Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908); In re Sariy-
anis, 173 Misc. 881, 19 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940) (repatriation of
incompetent); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1976) (total reliance on parens patriae in directing sterilization of an incom-
petent in order to protect an individual who was not able to make decisions in his
own best interests). But see application of D.D., 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139
(Surr. Ct. Nassau County 1977), which expressly refused to follow Sallmaier. See also
In re Guardianship of Eberhardy v. Circuit Court of Wood Co., 97 Wis. 2d 654, 294
N.Y.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
134. In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422,
114 A.2d 1 (1955).
135. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 451, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 534 (2d Dep't
1980).
136. Mormon Church v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890). The king "disposes of the fund to
such uses, analagous to those intended, as seems to him expedient and wise." Id. at
51-52. In England, when a gift intended for specific uses was declared void or where
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and to permit states to recover for damages to quasi-sovereign inter-
ests 137 separate from any recovery for injuries to individual state
residents. 138
Several provisions of New York State's Mental Hygiene Law were
enacted, in part, pursuant to the state's power of parens patriae. They
provide that treatment and care shall be accorded to those unable to
care for themselves or who suffer from a disability. 13  The law
includes provisions which authorize a hospital director, 140 a commu-
nity services director,' 4' or a peace officer, 142 to retain or take into
custody persons who appear mentally ill and are conducting them-
selves in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to themsel-
ves or others. In addition, persons who appear to be incapacitated by
alcohol, 43 or who admit to being drug-dependent, 44 can be tempo-
rarily institutionalized for observation, examination or treatment.
a charitable trust failed, the king, as parens patriae, applied the corpus of the gift or
trust to a use which was congruous with the general intent of the settlor, testor or
donee. This principle of substitution in accordance with the general intent of the
settlor, testator or donee of a charitable gift or trust has become known as cy-pres.
Id. at 55-56. This power arose in part from the court of chancery's power over trusts,
but more importantly from the right of the sovereign to act for the interests of
intended recipients of a gift who were incapable of asserting their rights. Id. at 56,
58.
137. The health, comfort and welfare of the populace, as well as interstate water
rights, pollution-free interstate waters and the state's economy are classified as quasi-
sovereign interests. This type of parens patriae suit may not be substituted for a class
action. Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits
for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 411 (1970).
138. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (injunctive relief based on
parens patriae for injury to state's economy); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)
(state as parens patriae may sue for injury to interstate water way); Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900) (state suit as parens patriae seeking injunctive relief for
injury to economy). Contra Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1971)
(permitted suit by state in its proprietary capacity for damages due to antitrust
violations, but rejected claim of state to sue as parens patriae for damages to its
economy). See generally Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment:
Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411 (1970). See also
West Va. v. Pfizer and Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
139. In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 756, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974); People v. La Burt, 27 Misc. 2d 584, 211 N.Y.S.2d 963, 965, aff'd, 14
A.D.2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1961). See also Bartol, Parens Patriae
Poltergeist of Mental Health Law, 3 L. & Pol'y Q. 191 (1981). The author argues
against the unlimited use of the parens patriae rationale in civil commitment cases.
Instead, greater emphasis should be placed on the police power rationale.
140. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1978).
141. Id. § 9.45 (Mckinney Supp. 1981).
142. Id. § 9.41 (Mckinney Supp. 1981).
143. Id. § 21.09(b) (McKinney Supp 1981).
144. Id. § 23.07(a) (McKinney Supp 1981).
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The theory of parens patriae provided a foundation for the recently
enacted New York Protective Services for Adults Law of the Social
Services Law which authorizes involuntary protective services for
adults judged to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical
harm.145 Therefore, the New York State Legislature has recognized
that people whose various disabilities render them unable to care for
themselves should neither be funneled into the criminal justice system
nor be abandoned. Subjecting these persons to criminal sanctions has
been deemed to be a poor and often unconstitutional solution, while
abandoning them is unlawful. Instead, state agents closest to the
problem should take such persons into custody and channel them into
treatment facilities designed to alleviate their specific malady.
Although the consent decree requires that the city establish intake
centers in order to contact those homeless individuals who shy away
from the bleak and dehumanizing city run shelters, 14 the city does not
have to actively seek homeless persons to apprise them of their rights
to shelter and the improved conditions of the city run facilities. It
appears that word of mouth is supposed to be sufficient. While the
city has implemented a limited effort in this regard, geared mainly
toward "shopping bag ladies," 147 it is neither of sufficient scale nor
funding to have a significant effect on the overall homeless problem.
The state legislature, therefore, should create an organized program
designed to seek out homeless persons and inform them of their rights,
the locations of various intake centers and available assistance. 148
In addition, in order to address the problem of homeless persons
precipitously discharged from state mental institutions, 149 legislation is
necessary to authorize peace and police officers to take into custody a
homeless person who appears to suffer from mental illness and is
incapable of caring for himself.15 0 Such a person could be transported
to the closest designated intake center where a brief psychiatric and
145. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 991; N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAW § 473-a (Art. 9B) (McKinney
Supp. 1981).
146. PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES, supra note 1, at 103-04.
147. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at Bll, col. 4.
148. The program would coordinate private and public social workers with
former members of the homeless population to help homeless individuals take advan-
tage of the rights and benefits legally guaranteed to them.
149. FROM THE BACK WARDS TO THE BACK ALLEYS, supra note 73, at 5, 17 (1978).
150. Peace and police officers could take custody of the person of someone in
imminent danger of death or serious injury pursuant to their special duties as enunci-
ated by the Mental Hygiene Law, if they have articulable reasons. See note 122
supra.
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medical examination would be possible. 15' This legislation would
enhance the effect of the consent decree because the state agent, who
is closest to the problem on a continuous basis, could take quick and
appropriate action without fear of incurring legal liability. 152
V. Conclusion
Few people subscribe to the belief that there is a definite final
solution to the long standing problem of homelessness. Most courses of
action pursued have been fraught with inconsistencies, inadequacies
and erroneous presumptions. It is imperative to enact specific legisla-
tion which rectifies the errors of the past. While the consent decree
and the New York Protective Services Law represent important new
approaches to coping with the particular problems of today's homeless
population, further legal steps must be taken to provide adequate
services for those who are incapable of caring for themselves. As long
as a large proportion of the homeless population consists of the men-
tally ill and the aged, local governments will need an expedient means
by which they can provide protective services on an emergency basis.
The doctrine of parens patriae, combined with the policies behind
several provisions of the Mental Health and Social Services Law,
constitutes a legal basis for such a law and should be invoked to that
end.
Mark Malone
151. If the diagnosis indicated that the person was incapable of making rational
decisions, then he or she could be transferred to the appropriate mental health
facility. If it were determined that this person was not in immediate need of hospital-
ization, then he or she would be given an opportunity to seek shelter and participate
in an appropriate mental health care program.
152. According to a report prepared by the Bureau of Management Systems,
Planning Research and Evaluation, the New York City police were one of the three
leading sources of referral to city shelters. BUREAU OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, PLAN-
NING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, SHELTER CARE CENTER FOR MEN REFERRAL SOURCES
AND CLIENT PnOFLE, (Mar. 1979). The state agent could transport the homeless
person to a shelter. It also is important that private and charitable institutions be
more fully involved by the city and state to help alleviate the plight of the homeless.
N.Y. Daily News, Feb 19, 1982, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1982, at Bl, col. 4;
Catholic New York, Feb. 7, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Balt. Morning Sun, Nov. 2, 1981, at
DI, col. 1. Such actions would be fiscally prudent because various religious groups
have displayed the ability to be fiscally efficient when providing services for the
homeless. On the Streets, Catholic New York, Oct. 4, 1981, at 8-9.
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